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This paper reviews price-level targeting in the light of current theoretical knowledge and 
past practical experience. We discuss progress in the economic debate on this issue, 
starting with the traditional arguments discussed in the early 1990s, moving to 
Svensson’s seminal paper in the late 1990s and ending with the most recent literature 
from the beginning of the new millennium. We devote special attention to the issues of 
the zero interest rate bound, time consistency and communication. Practical experience 
from Sweden in the 1930s and Czechoslovakia in the first few years after WWI is used to 
illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of price-level targeting. Finally, the 
similarities of price-level and inflation developments with hypothetical outcomes under 
price-level targeting are investigated in selected inflation-targeting countries. 
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Nontechnical Summary 
In this paper we review price-level targeting in the light of current theoretical knowledge and past 
practical experience. The main conclusion of the theoretical research is that reducing uncertainty 
about the future price level leads to better anchored price expectations. Firmly anchored 
expectations then improve the inflation and output variability trade-off and social welfare. 
However, this conclusion is sensitive to assumptions. If we change some of the assumptions, the 
benefits of price-level targeting in comparison to inflation targeting become less clear. 
Despite the efforts of academia to make the models more realistic, the models still hinge on 
questionable assumptions and therefore remain too simple to represent a real economy. Thus the 
question of whether, in practice, it is possible to exploit the theoretical benefits of price-level 
targeting remains unanswered. The benefits seem to prevail in a situation where the economy has 
reached the zero bound on interest rates. On the other hand, complicated communication of 
monetary policy and exposure to time-consistency problems are major drawbacks of price-level 
targeting. 
The experience of Sweden, whose monetary policy during the 1930s is often labelled as price-
level targeting, does not bring much knowledge due to the short duration and rather vague settings 
of the regime. Also, the experience of deflationary policy in Czechoslovakia after WWI, which 
could also be considered price-level targeting, is not very robust either. Given these open 
theoretical issues and the lack of practical experience, it is not surprising that despite vigorous 
academic discussions on price-level targeting in recent years, no central bank currently pursues 
this monetary policy strategy. 
The only central bank that is seriously considering introducing this regime is Canada. In this case, 
a switch to price-level targeting would not necessarily mean a big change in the conduct of 
monetary policy, as the actual results of inflation targeting there do not significantly differ from 
price-level targeting in terms of price-level developments. In the other inflation-targeting 
countries in our sample, switching from inflation targeting to price-level targeting would represent 








Academic discussions on price-level targeting have revived recently as some central banks have 
reached the zero interest rate bound and been forced to use unconventional monetary policy tools. 
In this situation, voices calling for the temporary use of price-level targeting until the zero interest 
rate problem is resolved and the threat of deflation is over have gained in importance. 
Nowadays, many central banks use inflation targeting as their monetary policy strategy. Under 
inflation targeting, after a shock hits an economy the central bank acts to bring inflation back to its 
target rate and abstracts away from the permanent effects of the shock on the price level. In 
contrast, under price-level targeting a central bank acts to return the price level to its original 
(targeted) path. This difference, although it might look small, has large implications for the 
formation of price expectations and the conduct, credibility and communication of monetary 
policy.  
Despite a substantial body of research on price-level targeting, central banks have very limited 
practical experience with this strategy. The Riksbank is considered to be the only central bank to 
have applied price-level targeting (in the 1930s). However, the experience of Czechoslovakia in 
the first few years after WWI also resembles price-level targeting. In this paper, we review both 
the existing academic research and the practical experience with price-level targeting.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical debate on price-
level targeting. In this section, we first review the traditional arguments for and against price-level 
targeting. We then summarise Svensson’s seminal 1999 paper, which initiated renewed interest in 
this strain of research. In section 2 we also discuss price-level targeting from the perspective of 
deflation risk and the existence of a zero bound on nominal interest rates, the communication of 
price-level targeting, and time-consistency problems. Section 3 provides a historical excursion to 
inter-war Sweden and Czechoslovakia, whose monetary policy regimes resembled price-level 
targeting. Price-level developments in inflation-targeting countries are also discussed in this 
section. Section 4 concludes with a summary. 
 
2. The Debate 
2.1 Traditional Argumentation 
Price-level targeting was advocated by Alfred Marshall (1887), Knut Wicksell (1898) and Irving 
Fisher (1922). Practical issues, however, were missing from their work. The pre-WWII literature 
saw price-level stability as a means of stabilising economic activity. After WWII, discussions 
concerning monetary policy focused mainly on inflation. 
The debate on the issue of price-level targeting (constant or constantly increasing) was enlivened 
at the beginning of 1990s. The topic was pursued by, among others, McCallum (1990), Lebow et 
al. (1992), Fillion and Tetlow (1994), Goodhart (1994), Duguay (1994), Fischer (1994) and 
Haldane and Salmon (1995). 4   Jiří Böhm, Jan Filáček, Ivana Kubicová and Romana Zamazalová 
 
   
Most working papers dating from this time period regard lower uncertainty about the future price 
level as the main benefit of price-level targeting. On the other hand, increased output variability 
(and – according to some authors – increased inflation variability) is considered the primary 
disadvantage of the regime. 
In the case of inflation targeting, there is considerable uncertainty about the price level in the 
distant future. The price level in this regime is a random walk, which implies that its variability is 
linearly increasing with the distance from the present time. This regime thus allows price-level 
drift. The unit root in the price level arising from the inflation target is mentioned in Lebow et al. 
(1992), Fillion and Tetlow (1994), Duguay (1994) and Haldane and Salmon (1995). On the 
contrary, a price-level target path implies – according to these authors – that the price level moves 
around the target path (which can be constantly rising) without a trend. In the case of price-level 
targeting, the uncertainty about future prices is thus supposed to be limited, as the central bank 
aims to eliminate all deviations from the price-level path (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Illustration of Price-Level and Inflation Paths under Inflation Targeting and under 
Price-Level Targeting 
      period       period






























price level and inflation after price shock
target
price level and inflation after price shock
 
Konieczny (1994) further notes that better predictability of the price level reduces the calculation 
costs of future consumption, improves the role of prices in the resource allocation process, and 
thus minimises the risk of errors which could lead to a suboptimal consumption structure. Howitt 
(1994) adds inappropriate allocation of capital as another possible consequence of these errors. 
Ragan (1994) argues that better predictability of the price level reduces the probability of default 
and thus cuts the costs of financial intermediation. 
Fisher (1994) primarily considers a zero inflation target, or a constant price-level target path. He 
also regards lower uncertainty about the future price level as the main advantage of price-level 
targeting. He sees drawbacks in the fact that in half of cases (when the price level deviates 
upwards from the target path) the monetary authority aims to achieve deflation, i.e. the inflation 
target is negative in the short run. He therefore believes that price-level targeting is an 
inappropriate regime which causes short-term fluctuations in the economy and more variability in 
the inflation rate. As it provides better predictability of prices in the long run, Fisher notes the Price-Level Targeting – A Real Alternative to Inflation Targeting?   5 
 
 
often cited advantage of price-level targeting in the form of higher attractiveness of long-term 
contracts or savings on pensions. He argues, however, that stable real pensions can be more easily 
achieved by issuing inflation-indexed bonds. The uncertainty about the future price level will 
probably not be markedly higher if central banks target a small, positive rate of inflation. 
According to Fisher, in terms of uncertainty about the future price level there is no significant 
difference between a zero inflation target and a target of 2–3%. As Fisher concludes, inflation 
targeting with lower uncertainty about inflation in the short run is more convenient in spite of the 
higher uncertainty about the price level in the long run. 
Besides commenting on the trade-off stemming from price-level targeting (i.e. the advantage of 
predictability of the price level in the long run and the disadvantage of increased output 
variability), Duguay (1994) also points out that costs related to the regime change need to be 
taken into consideration. There is a strong argument for prudence, seen by Duguay in uncertainty 
about the speed of adjustment of inflation expectations after switching to price-level targeting. 
Haldane and Salmon (1995) used stochastic simulations from a small macro-model. In many 
respects the outcome of their work is parallel to the conclusions of Lebow et al. (1992) and Fillion 
and Tetlow (1994). The main disadvantage of price-level targeting is seen by these authors in the 
situation of an adverse supply shock. As a supply shock changes the equilibrium price level, 
attempts to put the price level back to its pre-shock level will most probably lead to significant 
real costs. An additional cost is the increased variability of inflation in the short run, as 
“correcting” deviations from the target path increases inflation variability. 
Fillion and Tetlow (1994) argue, however, that there is a real possibility that price-level targeting 
could reduce inflation variability in comparison with inflation targeting. This would be so if prices 
are less prone to increase in the situation where economic agents understand that the central bank 
is committed to keeping the price level near the price target path. Black et al. (1997) came to the 
same conclusion using a stochastic model of the Canadian economy. This hypothesis was best 
illustrated by Svensson (1996), later published as Svensson (1999), which is described in detail in 
the next part. 
Kiley (1998) compares monetary policy in models with different specifications of the Phillips 
curve. The first specification is consistent with the neoclassical models of price adjustment. The 
second specification is based on models with sticky prices, implying the new-Keynesian Phillips 
curve. When comparing price-level targeting and inflation targeting, Kiley affirms a trade-off 
between stability of prices and stability of output in the new-Keynesian model, but not in the 
neoclassical one. Given the empirical support for the new-Keynesian specification, Kiley 
concludes that the stability trade-off probably exists. 
 
2.2 Svensson’s “Free Lunch” 
Svensson (1999) compares inflation targeting with price-level targeting in a model consisting of 
the Phillips curve and the central bank’s loss function. The traditional Phillips curve (1) assumes 
short-term  substitution between  inflation  π  and the output gap  y in the  presence of  output  gap  
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persistence and supply shocks 
t ε : 
( ) t 1 | 1 ε π π α ρ + − + = − − t t t t t y y           ( 1 )  
Private sector inflation expectations are rational in the model, conditional on information 
available in the given period,  t t t t E π π 1 1 | − − = . 
The central bank in the inflation-targeting regime stabilises inflation at the long-term inflation 
target π* and stabilises the output gap at a desirable level y*. The central bank’s loss function is 
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For the sake of simplicity the model assumes that the central bank has complete control over 
inflation (it has efficient instruments to achieve the desired level of inflation). Therefore, in every 
period after having observed the supply shock 
t ε  the central bank sets the optimum level of the 
inflation rate. In the model, monetary policy is effective due to output persistence arising from 
imperfections in the labour market and sticky prices. 
When using price-level targeting the central bank faces the same Phillips curve as mentioned 
above, but the loss function is defined in terms of the deviation of the output gap and the price 
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Svensson shows that if output (output gap) persistence is higher than 0.5, a discretionary policy of 
the central bank results in lower inflation variability in the case of price-level targeting than in the 
case of inflation targeting. The reason is that the monetary authority targeting the price level sets 
inflation proportionally to changes in the output gap, while under inflation targeting the optimal 
level of inflation in response to a supply shock is proportional to the size of the output gap. With 
output gap persistence, the variance of the first difference of the output gap is smaller than the 
variance of the level. 
Svensson further examines a situation where the society has a preference for inflation stabilisation 
(i.e. the social loss function is defined as (2)) and the central bank has a choice between loss 
functions (2) and (3). Svensson raises the question of whether it is preferable for the society to 
assign an inflation or price-level target to the central bank. It turns out that even with social 
preferences for inflation it is optimal to define the loss function of the central bank as (3), i.e. in 
the form of price-level targeting. 
The key assumptions of Svensson’s model are an endogenous decision rule and the assumption of 
discretionary monetary policy. If the central bank was able to adopt a credible commitment to 
long-term optimal monetary policy (which in Svensson’s model means that inflation is on target 
regardless of the size of the output gap), responding only to new information captured in the 
model by supply shocks, then the variability of output and inflation in the short run would be Price-Level Targeting – A Real Alternative to Inflation Targeting?   7 
 
 
lower under inflation targeting than under price-level targeting. However, Svensson questions the 
feasibility and credibility of monetary policy under commitment conducted by an independent 
central bank. 
 
2.3 Literature after Svensson 
In the same year that Svensson (1999) was published, Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (1999) 
reached the conclusion that in a forward-looking model, optimal monetary policy under 
commitment is characterised by stationary price levels. This has led to considerations that the 
target should be set in terms of the price level in the case of discretionary monetary policy. 
Clarida et al. (1999) came to similar results as Svensson (price-level targeting improves the trade-
off between output and inflation variability) using different models. The main difference is the use 
of a new-Keynesian Phillips curve, which contains current expectations of future inflation rather 
than past expectations of current inflation as they appear in the neoclassical Phillips curve. 
Dittmar and Gavin (2000) also replaced the neoclassical Phillips curve used by Svensson with the 
new-Keynesian version. Their conclusion is that the use of the new-Keynesian version highlights 
the benefits of price-level targeting because it is superior to inflation targeting even in the case of 
small or non-existent output persistence. However, it still holds true that the higher is the 
persistence, the bigger is the benefit from switching to price-level targeting. 
To explain the empirically observed persistence in inflation, some models assume that a fraction 
of economic agents set prices in a rule-of-thumb manner. Steinsson (2003) shows that as the 
fraction of rule-of-thumb price-setters increases, it becomes less optimal to offset cost-push 
shocks (i.e. to target the price level). On the contrary, with no rule-of-thumb price-setters in the 
economy it is optimal to offset cost-push shocks completely. Similar results were obtained by 
Gaspar et al. (2007). 
Ball et al. (2005) explain inflation persistence using the concept of costly information. In their 
model, all agents can change prices in every period (in contrast to Calvo pricing), but only a 
fraction of agents possess complete information about the current state of the economy, including 
the central bank’s behaviour. The model leads to optimal monetary policy with a stationary price 
level as it minimises agents’ errors when they set prices using incomplete information. 
The above-mentioned papers suggest that the extent to which economic agents are forward-
looking is of key importance when judging between price-level targeting and inflation targeting. 
The more forward-looking agents are, the more persuasive are the arguments in favour of price-
level targeting, because this regime is superior in anchoring price expectations. The degree of 
output persistence discussed in Svensson (1999) plays only a secondary role. 
This point is best illustrated by Vestin (2006). He uses a new-Keynesian model with forward-
looking agents and without cost-push shock persistence to show that with discretionary monetary 
policy with a loss function defined in price (not inflation) deviations and output deviations, the 
same level of social welfare can be achieved as with the optimal monetary policy under 
commitment by choosing an appropriate weight on output deviations. This is quite a strong result, 8   Jiří Böhm, Jan Filáček, Ivana Kubicová and Romana Zamazalová 
 
   
since in standard models the social welfare that can be attained under discretion is lower or equal 
to the welfare under commitment. If cost-push shock persistence is added to the model, social 
welfare becomes smaller than under commitment, but is still higher than under discretion with 
inflation deviations in the loss function. 
If both forward-looking and backward-looking agents act in the economy, the highest social 
welfare can, under some circumstances, be attained by combining price-level and inflation 
targeting. Average-inflation targeting, where the central bank targets the moving average of 
inflation, can be considered such a combination. Nessén and Vestin (2005) in the new-Keynesian 
setup as used by Steinsson (2003) show that if the proportion of backward-looking agents is larger 
than one half, average-inflation targeting yields higher social welfare than price-level targeting. 
The bigger is the proportion of backward-looking agents, the smaller is the optimal window size 
for average-inflation targeting. 
Another alternative way to merge inflation targeting and price-level targeting is called hybrid 
targeting, where the central bank’s loss function is defined in both inflation and price-level 
deviations. The loss function is then a generalisation of either inflation targeting (with zero weight 
on price-level deviations) or price-level targeting (with zero weight on inflation deviations). 
Models with a hybrid loss function lead to similar results as in the case of average-inflation 
targeting (see, for example, Barnett and Engineer, 2001, Batini and Yates, 2003, and Cecchetti 
and Kim, 2005) – if forward- and backward-looking agents coexist in an economy, hybrid 
targeting dominates both inflation targeting and price-level targeting. 
The majority of the models described above, including Svensson (1999), assume one good and 
one price only. The main disadvantage of these models is that it is impossible to analyse the 
evolution of relative prices. Ortega and  Rebei (2006) use a DSGE model of the Canadian 
economy with two sectors (traded and non-traded). The model assumes nominal price rigidities on 
both markets and nominal wage rigidity. No clear advantage of price-level targeting over inflation 
targeting appears in this model. 
Berentsen and Waller (2009) built a DSGE model with three markets – two goods markets and 
one credit market. All markets are fully flexible and money is necessary to trade on the markets. 
The central bank conducts monetary policy by controlling the supply of money. In this model 
setup, inflation targeting is ineffective and monetary expansion leads to higher price expectations 
and a higher nominal interest rate without any effect on the real economy, whereas price-level 
targeting efficiently anchors inflation expectations and monetary expansion has the desired impact 
on the real economy. 
Gerberding et al. (2010) use a new-Keynesian model with two sectors. One sector is for 
intermediate goods with prices broadly corresponding to the producer price index (PPI). The other 
sector is for trading final goods with prices corresponding to the consumer price index (CPI). 
Both sectors have rigid prices and are subject to different productivity shocks. The authors come 
to the conclusion that optimal monetary policy should allow non-stationary prices in both sectors. 
Price-level targeting implies a higher welfare loss than inflation targeting and the difference is 
increasing in the length of the monetary policy horizon up to a horizon of approximately 10 years. Price-Level Targeting – A Real Alternative to Inflation Targeting?   9 
 
 
De Resende et al. (2010) built a multi-sector New-Keynesian DSGE model with several levels of 
production. The model economy consists of two final goods sectors, one of them traded and the 
other non-traded, two intermediate sectors, a sector producing basic domestic inputs for other 
sectors, and an import sector. Both nominal and real rigidities exist in the economy. In this more 
realistic model setup, inflation targeting and price-level targeting are virtually equivalent from a 
welfare perspective. 
Another unrealistic assumption of Svensson (1999) and the majority of subsequent models is that 
all agents in the economy, or at least their forward-looking part, are rational and have a full 
information set and full confidence in the monetary authority. In the case of the transition from 
inflation targeting to price-level targeting, however, the learning process and credibility build-up 
can take several years. Gaspar et al. (2007) use a model with a constant-gain learning process to 
analyse the transition from inflation targeting to price-level targeting. They conclude that adaptive 
learning reduces the benefits of the switch, but the benefits remain positive unless learning is 
implausibly slow (the speed of learning coefficient is less than 0.02). 
Kryvtsov et al. (2008) use a simple new-Keynesian model with gradual adjustment in expectations 
to a new monetary policy regime of price-level targeting. With this model they reach similar 
conclusions as Gaspar et al. (2007). The transition yields higher welfare, but the gain is relatively 
small, of the order of hundredths of a per cent.
1 Cateau et al. (2009) estimate approximately five 
times higher gains from the transition to an imperfectly credible new regime. The results are 
obtained from a DSGE model of the Canadian economy. Only if imperfect credibility prevails for 
13 years or longer do the costs of introducing a new regime exceed its benefits. 
Preston (2008) built a model with central bank uncertainty about the true behaviour of economic 
agents. Households use adaptive learning to form their expectations, but the central bank might 
have a misspecified model and might wrongly assume rational expectations. In this situation, an 
inflation-targeting regime is likely to lead to instability in the economy. However, if the same 
wrong assumption is made in a price-level targeting regime, the economy remains stable for many 
empirically reasonable parameter values. 
 
2.4 Risk of Deflation and the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates 
Price-level targeting is often discussed in association with the problem of reaching the lower 
(zero) bound on interest rates, a situation with which Japan has been confronted since the mid-
1990s but which has also concerned the United States and many other countries during the recent 
financial and economic crisis. When the monetary policy rate is at or near the zero bound, the 
central bank’s influence on inflation expectations and thus on real interest rates becomes an 
important stabilisation tool. With a credible regime of price-level targeting, after the price level 
drops below the target path, short-term inflation expectations will increase above average inflation 
in the long run and real interest rates will decrease. 
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Duguay (1994) argues that the benefit of credible price-level targeting is its stabilising effects on 
aggregate demand by raising real interest rates (through an expected price/inflation decrease) 
when the price level moves above the target, and by lowering them (via an expected 
price/inflation increase) when the price level falls below the target. Coulombe (1998) points out 
that credible price-level targeting can help limit the zero-bound problem, as it reduces the need to 
change nominal interest rates. This idea is also advocated by Berg and Jonung (1998), who 
believe that one important lesson to be drawn from the Swedish experience of the 1930s (see part 
3.1) is that the price-level target can be used to increase inflation expectations in a situation of 
serious concerns of deflation. Svensson (2001) suggests – as a possible way out of the liquidity 
trap – that Japan should temporarily introduce price-level targeting and at the same time the 
Japanese yen should be devalued and fixed. The view that price-level targeting can help avoid the 
zero-bound problem and lead an economy out of the deflation trap is also held by Eggertson and 
Woodford (2003) and Wolman (2005). 
However, there are also studies emphasising the higher probability of reaching zero interest rates 
and the possible risk of deflation in the case of price-level targeting in comparison to conventional 
cases. This concerns the situation where a marked overshooting of the target would require 
pushing the price level back to the target path, implying a need for a longer period of deflation, 
which could induce financial instability. For example, Friedman and Gertler (2003) dispute the 
conclusions of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), whose model does not include any of the 
mechanisms that make deflation harmful (e.g. debt defaults) and assumes perfect credibility of the 
central bank. Fear of deflation has been stressed in several studies (e.g. Mishkin, 2001). On the 
other hand, Ragan (2006) argues that sustained deflation, which would pose a threat to the 
financial system, is not probable in credible price-level targeting. 
Nevertheless, the argument that price-level targeting can help avoid the zero bound problem and 
get the economy out of the deflation trap has gained more support recently. Mishkin (2006) 
mentions that arguments in favour of price-level targeting are very strong in cases of a 
deflationary environment mainly because of two facts: besides the effect of the expectations 
channel as described previously, price-level targeting has a positive impact on banks’ and non-
financial corporations’ balance sheets which – after a prolonged period of deflation – are showing 
severe problems and increased non-performing loans that prevent the financial system from 
working properly and impair the efficient allocation of capital. 
Amano and Ambler (2008) compare inflation targeting and price-level targeting in a situation of 
low trend inflation using a small calibrated DSGE model. They conclude that price-level targeting 
is more effective in keeping the economy away from the zero bound on nominal interest rates; and 
if the economy gets to the zero bound, it remains there for a shorter period of time. They also 
found that when the price level is targeted, the optimal rate of inflation is lower than under 
inflation targeting, thus yielding a higher level of economic welfare. 
Murchison (forthcoming)
2 examines the ability of the two monetary policy regimes to mitigate the 
effects of the zero bound on nominal interest rates in ToTEM, a model calibrated to replicate 
important features of the Canadian economy. This work will offer quantitative insights into the 
stabilisation properties of the regimes. The simulation results indicate that, relative to a version of 
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the model without the zero bound, economic loss
3 increases by about 2% under an optimised 
inflation-targeting rule, whereas under an optimised price-level targeting rule the increase in loss 
is less than 1%. 
Coibion et al. (2010) compare the regimes in the new-Keynesian model and they also conclude 
that the zero bound on nominal interest rates is less likely to be hit in the case of price-level 
targeting.  
 
2.5 Communicating Price-Level Targeting and the Time-Inconsistency Problem 
In contrast to inflation targeting, where communication is quite straightforward and focused on 
the inflation target, communicating price-level targeting is much more difficult (see, e.g., Kahn, 
2009). If a central bank targets an upward-sloping path for the price level, it is not possible to 
present the target using a single number. Any communication of the initial value and targeted rate 
of increase of the price level would be difficult for the public to understand and remember. Also, 
for some economic agents and their decision-making, the rate of inflation might be of more 
importance than the price level, especially if they have long experience with an inflation-targeting 
regime. 
Alternatively, it is possible to implement price-level targeting but to continue communicating 
inflation and leave an inflation target in place. However, the inflation target would have to be 
adjusted frequently depending on shocks hitting the economy (see, e.g., Ambler, 2009). 
Alternatively, an average inflation target over a longer time period could be communicated, 
ideally together with monetary policy being conducted in the average-inflation targeting manner 
(see the discussion of average-inflation targeting in part 2.3). Ambler argues that central banks 
that have explicit inflation targets are already implicitly using average-inflation targeting with a 
time window of one year, since they target the year-over-year rate of inflation. Moving from a 
one-year average to an average defined using a longer time window would not entail a radical 
change in communication (e.g. the Reserve Bank of Australia communicates its target as average 
inflation over the business cycle, while the Reserve Bank of New Zealand targets average 
inflation over the medium term). But even then, communication would be more difficult 
compared to inflation targeting, for example when describing the forecast (should the central 
bank’s reaction function be defined in terms of an inflation or price-level target?) or when 
assessing target fulfilment (which deviation is more relevant – deviation from the price-level 
target or deviation from the inflation target?). 
At the same time, price-level targeting might make people think that the central bank puts too 
much emphasis on past economic developments and too little emphasis on future developments as 
captured in the forecast. The more backward-looking nature of the price-level targeting 
framework as compared to inflation targeting is discussed in more detail in Carlstrom and Fuerst 
(2002). 
                                                           
3 Besides the variance of inflation and the variance of the output gap, economic loss also includes the variance of 
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For all these reasons, price-level targeting poses a big communication challenge. Successful 
communication is the key prerequisite for achieving the major benefit of price-level targeting, 
namely anchored price expectations. The importance of communication in price-level targeting is 
strengthened by the existence of the time-inconsistency problem,
4 which can put regime 
credibility to the test. 
The time-inconsistency problem in the context of price-level targeting can be described in the 
following way. In the event of a positive cost-push shock, a central bank promises future inflation 
below its long-run average. This has a positive effect on inflation expectations and lowers the 
costs of absorbing the shock. However, as soon as the shock dissipates and inflation (not the price 
level) is back at its long-run level, it would be optimal for the central bank, and also for the 
economy as a whole, to renege on its announced policies, i.e. not to offset positive shocks to the 
price level by pushing inflation below its long-run average, as this would harm output. Then, the 
price level would not return to its targeted trajectory. However, it needs to be stressed here that in 
the short run the suboptimal policy of offsetting the shock is necessary to maintain the credibility 
of the price-level targeting regime in the long run. Masson and Shukayev (2011) show that if the 
public believes in the possibility of the central bank resetting the price-level target, switching to 
price-level targeting can have detrimental consequences for macroeconomic volatility. 
All the models described in the previous parts of the paper assume time-consistent conduct of 
price-level targeting. However, in real life it might happen that both the public and professionals 
regard the short-run benefits of violating time consistency as appealing. In that situation, the 
central bank would be under strong pressure to break the time-consistency principle. In the end, 
the central bank might fail to resist public pressure and might abandon its efforts to return the 
price level to the targeted level. 
The proposal of Evans (2010) to use price-level targeting only in certain, precisely defined 
situations represents a possible way out of the time-inconsistency problem. One such situation is a 
liquidity trap accompanied by a double-digit unemployment rate. Evans considers this a relatively 
rare event, with a frequency of twice a century or even lower. Temporary adoption of price-level 
targeting would enhance the credibility of the commitment to keep interest rates at zero for a 
sustained period and help the central bank to escape the liquidity trap. 
The time-inconsistency problem under price-level targeting, or exchange rate targeting as an 
alternative way to escape the liquidity trap, is also acknowledged in Jeanne and Svensson (2007). 
They start from the assumption that besides its standard monetary policy objectives a central bank 
also considers the capital of the bank and tries to avoid a situation in which capital falls below a 
certain minimum level. Economic agents know that the central bank will not accept future 
exchange rate appreciation because that would have a negative impact on the capital due to 
revaluation of the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves. However, this line of reasoning falls 
short in light of the practical experience of central banks that have negative capital (including the 
Czech National Bank). These banks have not encountered any adverse effects of low or even 
negative capital on their decision-making or independence. 
                                                           
4 The time-inconsistency problem is one of the basic theoretical issues which have been in the focus of the new 
monetary policy paradigm since the late 1970s and which have led to the crystallisation of inflation targeting 
as a “state-of-the-art” monetary policy regime. Inflation targeting, if conducted in a flexible manner, does not 
face this problem.  Price-Level Targeting – A Real Alternative to Inflation Targeting?   13 
 
 
3. Practical Experience with Price-Level Targeting 
3.1 Price-Level Targeting in Sweden 1931–1937 
Even though price-level targeting is given significant academic attention, practical experience 
with this regime is limited. In the existing literature, the Riksbank is considered to be the only 
central bank in the world to have applied the regime in practice (Berg and Jonung, 1998). 
Sveriges Riksbank adopted price-level targeting in 1931 after the Swedish krona faced speculative 
attacks on its convertibility to gold. As soon as the krona quit the gold standard the Swedish 
government declared a commitment to stabilise prices “using all means available”. As a result of 
the economic crisis and price developments in Europe, consumer and producer prices in Sweden 
were declining from 1928 onwards. Appreciation of the krona exchange rate after the gold 
standard was abandoned put Swedish prices under additional downside pressure. Therefore, the 
aim of monetary policy was to bring an end to declining prices and to ensure price stability in the 
future. 
In the spring 1932, after eight months of work by several influential economists both from 
academia (Gustav Cassel, David Davidson and Eli Heckscher) and from the Riksbank and after 
lively public discussion, the Swedish parliament adopted a monetary policy programme for price 
stabilisation. This programme consisted of five major points: 
1) The krona was to return to the gold standard or peg to the British pound in the future. For the 
time being, Sweden was to maintain a flexible exchange rate for the krona. Efforts to control the 
value of the krona were to start from the domestic price level and the needs of Sweden’s 
economy. 
2) Continued deflation was to be resisted as strongly as inflation. 
3) Some recovery in prices was desirable, though not a return to a “too distant” price level. Price 
increases due to custom duties were to be accepted. 
4) Monetary policy was not to be tied schematically to a particular price index. 
5) Interest rates were to be kept as low as conceivably possible without jeopardising the monetary 
policy objective. 
In June 1933, the programme was extended to include a sixth point giving the Riksbank a high 
degree of autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy, nowadays called instrumental 
independence. The Riksbank could choose the means of achieving the monetary policy objectives, 
but the objectives themselves were set by the parliament. 
The Riksbank tried to return to a fixed rate as early as November 1931 by pegging the krona to 
the pound at the old gold parity rate. However, this attempt lasted for only three days. Between 
1932 and 1933, the Riksbank accumulated foreign reserves and in July 1933 it established a 
successful peg of the krona to the British pound which lasted until the outbreak of WWII. This 
fixed exchange rate arrangement to the pound was viewed as being consistent with the programme 14   Jiří Böhm, Jan Filáček, Ivana Kubicová and Romana Zamazalová 
 
   
as long as prices in the United Kingdom moved in a moderate way consistent with the purpose of 
price stability. The only exception was the period 1936–1937, when British prices rose sharply. 
Price-level targeting was definitively abandoned in 1937, when the influence of the Keynes 
paradigm led to the extension of the Riksbank’s mandate to stability of the economy and full 
capacity utilisation. At the same time, the Riksbank’s independence was weakened as the 
government pushed for stronger coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. 
Not many robust conclusions can be deduced from the experience of the Riksbank. Price-level 
targeting in its pure form existed for only a short period of time (until 1933, when the exchange 
rate was fixed). Due to this short experience, the Riksbank’s credibility was not put to the test and 
the Riksbank did not face the problem of time inconsistency. Also, the Riksbank did not produce 
economic forecasts and it set interest rates based on actual price developments (and later on the 
policy of the Bank of England). Cournède and Moccero (2009) find the Riksbank’s policy 
difficult to gauge due to a lack of any commitment to a specific policy horizon. Straumann and 
Woitek (2009) argue that the Riksbank was striving for a fixed exchange rate rather than for stable 
prices. It can also be argued that the transition from the gold standard to price-level targeting (and 
back) did not represent a significant change in monetary policy, as the gold standard was de facto 
price-level targeting determined by the price of a single commodity – gold. 
 
3.2 Rašín’s Deflationary Policy in Czechoslovakia 1919–1923 
Even though the Riksbank is mentioned as the first and until now the only central bank to have 
targeted the price level, the earlier experience of Czechoslovakia in the first years of its existence 
can be considered price-level targeting. Unlike in Sweden, where the regime was used to curb 
deflation, in Czechoslovakia it was introduced for the opposite and more painful purpose, to 
produce deflation with the aim of bringing the price level back down to its pre-war level. This 
experience is described in the following paragraphs, drawing upon Rašín (1920), Rašín (1922), 
Jíša (1993), Matoušková (2008) and Vencovský (2003). 
The deflationary policy was the second stage of a currency reform realised between 1919 and 
1923 by Alois Rašín. The purpose of this policy was to offset price increases from the previous 
war years. Similarly to Sweden later on, Czechoslovakia planned to re-introduce the gold 
standard. The last stage of the currency reform was to be stabilisation of the price level and the 
koruna exchange rate at stronger levels.  
The first part of the currency reform – restriction of currency in circulation (during which the 
volume of currency in circulation dropped by roughly one third) – was carried out together with 
the currency separation of the Czech koruna from the Austrian crown. This restriction, however, 
did not prove to be very effective, as prices doubled in 1920 (see Figure 2). Although part of this 
increase in prices can be explained by an increase in indirect taxes and loose fiscal policy, it was 
obvious that reduction of the amount of money in circulation was not sufficient to achieve a lower 
price level. For that reason, in 1921 Rašín chose a different way – foreign exchange operations 
aimed at causing the koruna to appreciate, namely foreign currency borrowing. Price-Level Targeting – A Real Alternative to Inflation Targeting?   15 
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Note: from 1913 to 1920 non-weighted index of administered prices of 38 items; between 1921 
and 1923 prices of food, fuels, petrol and soap; from 1924 onwards food prices. Source: 
Ministry of Finance Report on Supplying People in Czechoslovakia, 1920, Statistical 




The impacts of the deflationary policy on the real economy were rather severe. Industrial 
production dropped markedly in the period of 1921–1923. Similar developments in agricultural 
production were prevented only by the post-war shortage of basic food in a market that stimulated 
demand for production of these products despite adverse price developments. Exports also 
slumped in this period. This was not surprising given the intentional koruna appreciation amid 
marked depreciation of the currencies of Czechoslovakia’s main trading partners (Germany and 
Austria) against the Swiss franc and the strong protectionism applied in most countries. Figure 3 
depicts the koruna’s exchange rate against the Swiss franc together with the exchange rates of the 
German mark and Austrian krone (schilling).  16   Jiří Böhm, Jan Filáček, Ivana Kubicová and Romana Zamazalová 
 
   








 21.2.1919   5.2.1920   31.3.1921   29.4.1922   30.4.1923 
Frs/100 Kč  Frs/100 Kr  Frs/100 M
 
Source: Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovakia, 1925, Matoušková (2008) 
 
 
Despite this exchange rate appreciation, the balance of trade remained in surplus as imports 
slumped due to protectionist measures applied by the Czech government. Whereas gross domestic 
product grew by 8% in 1921, in 1922 it dropped by 3%. The falling economic performance raised 
unemployment, firms were caught in insolvency, and the banking sector, which had close 
relations with industry in the early years of the state, also encountered problems. However, the 
economy recovered surprisingly quickly and grew at a high pace (8% on average) in the rest of 
the 1920s, the year 1926 being the only exception (see Figure 4). Price-Level Targeting – A Real Alternative to Inflation Targeting?   17 
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The deflationary policy markedly worsened the economic position in the short run, but on the 
other hand it set up favourable conditions for the stabilisation and long-run growth of the 
Czechoslovak economy. Simultaneously, it made the new Czechoslovak koruna a credible 
currency. At that time, the koruna was a freely convertible currency and in 1929 it even returned 
to the gold standard and stayed there for the next five years. 
It is important to view Rašín’s reform with a historical perspective. After WWI it was necessary 
to improve the gloomy post-war state of the Czechoslovak economy and re-orient its directive 
management and its structure stemming from the war period towards market principles. In doing 
that, it was necessary to establish an independent currency and rule out internal and external 
devaluation, as was observed, for example, in Germany. Despite its high openness, the post-war 
economy was self-sufficient in production of basic needs such as food and coal. At the same time, 
the domestic economy, like the economies of neighbouring countries, was affected by various 
protectionist measures. That explains why the link between the exchange rate and the prices of 
goods for daily use was not strong. The question also remains as to whether the koruna 
appreciation and subsequent fall in prices reflected the steadier economic and political situation in 
Czechoslovakia compared to neighbouring countries rather than foreign exchange interventions. 
Similarly to Sweden, not many robust conclusions can be derived from the Czechoslovak 
experience. The reform was meant to be a temporary measure prior to a return to the gold 
standard. There was no independent central bank before 1926, monetary policy instruments were 
still developing, and the economy had been badly damaged by the war and heavily affected by 
protectionist policy both in Czechoslovakia and in neighbouring countries. Therefore, it is hard to 18   Jiří Böhm, Jan Filáček, Ivana Kubicová and Romana Zamazalová 
 
   
assess the role of the reform in subsequent economic developments. However, the reform did 
achieve its main objectives – the price level decreased and the gold standard was re-introduced.  
 
3.3 Price-Level Developments in Inflation-Targeting Countries 
Owing to the limited empirical experience it is worthwhile to analyse price-level developments in 
inflation-targeting countries, especially the deviation of the actual price level from the 
hypothetical price-level path computed from inflation targets. This would test the hypothesis 
made by some economists, among them Fischer (1994), that the difference between inflation 
targeting and price-level targeting is not substantial in practice. 
Ruge-Murcia (2009) analyses price-level developments in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom and covers the time period between the introduction of inflation 
targeting in each country and September 2009. Ruge-Murcia found that in terms of actual price-
level developments, inflation targeting was very similar to price-level targeting in Australia, 
Canada and the United Kingdom. On the contrary, in the cases of New Zealand and Sweden the 
price level moved away from the price-level path implied by the inflation targets (upwards in New 
Zealand, downwards in Sweden). 
In addition to graphical analysis, Ruge-Murcia ran unit root tests both on the price level and on 
the deviation of the price level from its hypothetical path. Under inflation targeting, both these 
variables should have a unit root, whereas under price-level targeting the existence of a unit root 
should be rejected. The results of the statistical tests confirmed the findings from the graphical 
analysis – inflation targeting is highly similar to price-level targeting in the cases of Canada and 
the United Kingdom. However, no similarity was found for Australia, New Zealand and Sweden. 
In conclusion, Ruge-Murcia presented an idea that the equivalence of inflation targeting and 
price-level targeting in terms of the actual price-level developments observed in Canada and in the 
United Kingdom could have been a result of distinct approaches to inflation targeting in 
comparison to the other countries.  
Ruge-Murcia’s results are quite surprising. The monetary policy regimes in Australia and New 
Zealand can be viewed as average-inflation targeting,
5 which is close to price-level targeting. 
Therefore, in contrast to Ruge-Murcia’s results, one would expect high similarity of inflation 
targeting with price-level targeting in these two countries.  
In the following paragraphs we build on the work of Ruge-Murcia, extending the analysis in two 
ways. First, we prolong the sample period to December 2010, which brings in more recent data 
affected by the financial crisis and the recent rise in commodity prices. Second, we also include 
the Czech Republic in the sample. Analogously to Ruge-Murcia, we do both graphical analysis 
and unit root testing.  
Figure 5 depicts the inflation and price-level developments in Australia, Canada, the Czech 
Republic, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Inflation is shown in comparison with 
                                                           
5 Australia targets inflation of between 2 and 3 per cent on average over the cycle, while New Zealand targets 
CPI inflation outcomes of between 1 per cent and 3 per cent on average over the medium term. Price-Level Targeting – A Real Alternative to Inflation Targeting?   19 
 
 
the inflation target, and the price level in comparison with the hypothetical price-level path 
computed from the inflation target(s). The price level is set to 100 at the beginning of the sample 
(the introduction of inflation targeting in the country concerned). The hypothetical price-level 
path is computed from this initial price level assuming that the hypothetical target growth rate of 
the price level is equal to the inflation target (which can change over time, as in the cases of the 
Czech Republic, New Zealand and the United Kingdom). 
 
Figure 5: Inflation and Price-Level Developments in Comparison with the Inflation Target and 
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Note: In the upper graphs, inflation in per cent is drawn in blue and the inflation target(s) in red. In the 
lower graphs, the price level is in blue and the price-level path computed from the inflation target(s) 
in red. For the United Kingdom, RPIX inflation is used until December 2003, as it was initially 
targeted by the Bank of England. For the Czech Republic, so-called net inflation is used until 
December 2001, as it was targeted by the Czech National Bank in the first years of inflation 
targeting. 
 
The most recent inflation data are in most cases in line with the inflation target, with the exception 
of the United Kingdom, where inflation exceeds the target from December 2009 onwards. Also, 
inflation in the Czech Republic since the introduction of inflation targeting in January 1998 has 
been mostly below the target(s). As a result, the price level has deviated significantly downwards 
from the hypothetical price-level target path, i.e. similarly as in Sweden (see above). If price-level 
targeting was conducted instead of inflation targeting, average inflation would have to be roughly 
double compared to actual inflation. 
The table in the Appendix shows the unit root tests for all six countries in our sample. To make 
the results comparable, we conducted the tests with exactly the same settings as Ruge-Murcia. We 
test for unit roots both in the price level and in the deviation of the price level from its 
hypothetical target path. We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron 
(PP) test. The unit root tests for the price level take into account the intercept and the trend, 
whereas the tests for the deviation from the hypothetical price-level path are run without the trend 
and with/without the intercept. The level of augmentation of the ADF test (that is, the number of 
lagged first differences in the OLS regression) was selected using recursive t-tests. The truncation 
lag of the PP test is set to three in all cases. Ruge-Murcia’s estimates are also provided in the 
Appendix for the sake of comparison. 
The results using the extended data set confirm Ruge-Murcia’s finding that in the cases of 
Australia, New Zealand and Sweden the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected. 
However, the rejection of unit roots in the cases of Canada and the United Kingdom is not as 
unambiguous as in the shorter sample used by Ruge-Murcia. The results are strikingly different 
for the United Kingdom, where only one test out of the six is significant at the 10% significance 
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in significance can be explained by inflation having been well above the target in 2010, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.  
The results for the Czech Republic are also surprising, as the unit root tests with the intercept 
reject a unit root in the deviation of the price level from its hypothetical path with 5% 
significance. This finding sharply contrasts with Figure 5, where the actual price level lies far 
below the hypothetical path. However, it can also be seen from Figure 5 that the deviation of the 
actual price level from its hypothetical path is steadily increasing in time. In the test, this deviation 
is absorbed by the intercept and the price level adjusted for this deviation reveals signs of 
stationarity. If the intercept is not included in the test, the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
Overall, we conclude that in the Czech Republic the actual price-level developments reject the 
similarity of inflation targeting with price-level targeting. The same results are obtained for 
Australia, New Zealand and Sweden. In the case of the United Kingdom, the PP tests reveal some 
similarity of inflation targeting with price-level targeting, but these results are not very significant. 
Only in Canada do the actual price and inflation developments resemble the hypothetical 
outcomes under price-level targeting. Given this observed similarity of inflation targeting with 
price-level targeting in Canada, it is not surprising that the Bank of Canada is considering 
switching to price-level targeting, possibly as early as 2012 (IMF, 2010).  
 
4. Conclusion 
Academic discussions on price-level targeting have revived recently as some central banks have 
reached the zero interest rate bound and been forced to use unconventional monetary policy tools. 
In this situation, voices calling for the temporary use of price-level targeting until the zero interest 
rate problem is resolved and the threat of deflation is over have gained in popularity. 
Currently, no central bank is using price-level targeting. The Bank of Canada is considering 
introducing this regime. In the case of Canada, a switch to price-level targeting would not 
necessarily mean a big change, since the actual results of inflation targeting there do not 
significantly differ from price-level targeting in terms of price-level developments. In other 
inflation-targeting countries, switching from inflation targeting to price-level targeting would 
represent a considerable change in the conduct of monetary policy.  
The experience of Sweden, whose monetary policy during the 1930s is often labelled as price-
level targeting, does not bring much knowledge due to the short duration and rather vague settings 
of the regime. The experience of Rašín’s deflationary policy in Czechoslovakia in the first years 
after WWI, which could also be considered price-level targeting, is not very valuable for today’s 
monetary policy considerations either. 
The lack of practical experience sharply contrasts with the substantial body of research on price-
level targeting. The main conclusion of the theoretical research is that reducing uncertainty about 
the future price level leads to better-anchored price expectations. Firmly anchored expectations 
then improve the inflation and output variability trade-off and social welfare. However, this 
conclusion is sensitive to assumptions. If, for example, a large proportion of economic agents are 22   Jiří Böhm, Jan Filáček, Ivana Kubicová and Romana Zamazalová 
 
   
backward-looking, if the learning process for adapting a new regime lasts many years, or if there 
are significant real or nominal rigidities in the markets, the benefits of price-level targeting in 
comparison to inflation targeting are less clear. 
The benefits of price-level targeting are manifest in models which allow for a zero interest rate 
bound, as anchored price expectations make it possible to achieve negative real interest rates 
despite nominal interest rates being bound by zero. These models also conclude that reaching the 
zero interest rate bound is less likely under price-level targeting. 
Despite the efforts of academia to make the models more realistic (e.g. by introducing micro-
foundations, heterogeneous markets or a learning process), the models still hinge on questionable 
assumptions (e.g. i.i.d. supply shocks and a fully functional transmission mechanism) and 
therefore offer too simple a representation of a real economy. Thus, the question of whether it is 
possible, in practice, to exploit the theoretical benefits of price-level targeting remains 
unanswered. 
The obvious disadvantage of price-level targeting is more complicated communication of 
monetary policy, either of the target or of day-to-day central bank decision making. It would be 
difficult to explain, for example, the intention to achieve low or even negative inflation in reaction 
to an inflationary shock. In this situation, the central bank encounters time-consistency problems, 
and, besides dealing with communication problems, it might be exposed to political pressures to 
opportunistically quit price-level targeting. 




AMANO, R. AND S. AMBLER (2008): “Inflation Targeting, Price-Level Path Targeting and the Zero 
Lower Bound.” Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional, mimeo. 
AMANO, R. AND M. D. SHUKAYEV (2010): “Monetary Policy and the Zero Bound on Nominal 
Interest Rates.” Bank of Canada Review, Summer 2010, pp. 3–10. 
AMBLER,  S.  (2009): “Price-Level Targeting and Stabilisation Policy: A Survey.” Journal 
of Economic Surveys Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 974–997. 
BALL, L. N., G. MANKIW, AND R. REIS (2005): “Monetary Policy for Inattentive Economies.” 
Journal of Monetary Economics No. 52, pp. 703–725. 
BARNETT, R. AND M. ENGINEER (2001): “When is Price-Level Targeting a Good Idea?” in Price 
Stability and the Long-Run Target for Monetary Policy, pp. 101–143, proceedings of a 
seminar held by the Bank of Canada, June 2000. 
BATINI, N. AND A. YATES (2003): “Hybrid Inflation and Price Level Targeting.” Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking Vol. 35, pp. 283–300. 
BERENTSEN, A. AND C. WALLER (2009): “Price Level Targeting and Stabilization Policy.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2009-033B. 
BERG, C. AND L. JONUNG (1998): “Pioneering Price Level Targeting: The Swedish Experience 
1931–1937.” SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 290. 
BLACK, R., T. MACKLEM, AND D. ROSE (1997): “On Policy Rules for Price Stability.” in Price 
Stability, Inflation Targets, and Monetary Policy, pp. 411–461, proceedings of a conference 
held by the Bank of Canada, May 1997. 
CARLSTROM, C. T. AND T. S. FUERST (2002): “Monetary Policy Rules and Stability: Inflation 
Targeting versus Price-Level Targeting.” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic 
Commentary, February 15, 2002. 
CATEAU, G., O. KRYVTSOV, M. SHUKAYEV, AND A. UEBERFELDT (2009): “Adopting Price-Level 
Targeting under Imperfect Credibility in ToTEM.” Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2009-
17. 
CECCHETTI,  S.  G. AND J.  KIM  (2005):  “Inflation Targeting, Price-Path Targeting and Output 
Variability.” NBER Working Paper No. 9672. 
CLARIDA,  R.,  J.  GALI, AND M.  GERTLER  (1999):  “The Science of Monetary Policy: A New 
Keynesian Perspective.” Journal of Economic Literature No. 37, pp. 1661–1707.  
COIBION, O., Y. GORODNICHENKO, AND J. WIELAND (2010): “The Optimal Inflation Rate in New 
Keynesian Models.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 16093. 
CÔTÉ, A. (2007): “Price-Level Targeting.” Bank of Canada Discussion Paper No.8. 
COULOMBE, S. (1998): “The Intertemporal Nature of Information Conveyed by the Price System.” in 
Price Stability, Inflation Targets, and Monetary Policy, pp. 3–28, proceedings of a conference 
held by the Bank of Canada, May 1997. 24   Jiří Böhm, Jan Filáček, Ivana Kubicová and Romana Zamazalová 
 
   
COURNÈDE, B. AND D. MOCCERO (2009): “Is there a Case for Price-Level Targeting?” OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 721. 
DE RESENDE, C., A. DIB, AND M. KICHIAN (2010): “Alternative Optimized Monetary Policy Rules 
in Multi-Sector Small Open Economies: The Role of Real Rigidities.” Bank of Canada 
Working Paper 2010-9. 
DITTMAR, R. AND W. GAVIN (2000): “What Do New-Keynesian Phillips Curves Imply for Price-
Level Targeting?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review No. 81, pp. 21–30. 
DUGUAY, P. (1994): “Some Thoughts on Price Stability versus Zero Inflation.” mimeo, Bank of 
Canada. 
EGGERTSSON, G. B. AND M. WOODFORD (2003): “The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal 
Monetary Policy.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 1, pp. 139–211. 
EVANS,  C.  L.  (2010):  “Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Environment: Developing a State-
Contingent Price-Level Target.” speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s 55th 
Economic Conference, October 16, 2010. 
FILLION, J. F. AND R. TETLOW (1994): “Zero-Inflation or Price-Level Targeting? Some Answers 
from Stochastic Simulations on a Small Open-Economy Macro Model.” in Economic 
Behaviour and Policy Choice under Price Stability, pp. 129–166, proceedings of a conference 
held by the Bank of Canada, October 1993. 
FISCHER, S. (1994): “Modern Central Banking.” in The Future of Central Banking: The Tercentenary 
Symposium of the Bank of England, pp. 262–308, edited by F. Capie, C. Goodhart, S. Fischer 
and S. Schnadt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
FISHER, I. (1922): The Purchasing Power of Money, MacMillan. 
Friedman, B. M. and M. Gertler (2003): “Comments and Discussion: ‘The Zero Bound on Interest 
Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy’ by G. B. Eggertsson and M. Woodford.” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity No. 1, pp. 212–233. 
GASPAR, V., F. SMETS, AND D. VESTIN (2007): “Is Time Ripe for Price Level Path Stability?” ECB 
Working Paper No. 818. 
GERBERDING, C., R. GERKE, AND F. HAMMERMANN (2010): “Price-Level Targeting When There 
is Price-Level Drift.” Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No. 23/2010. 
GOODHART,  C.  A.  E.  (1994):  “What Should Central Banks Do? What Should Be Their 
Macroeconomic Objectives and Operations?” Economic Journal No. 104, pp. 1424–1436. 
HALDANE, A. G. AND C. K. SALMON (1995): “Three Issues on Inflation Targets.” in Targeting 
Inflation, edited by A. Haldane, pp. 170–201, a conference of central banks on the use of 
inflation targets organised by the Bank of England, March 1995, London: Bank of England. 
HOWITT, P. (1994): Panel discussion, Economic Behaviour and Policy Choices under Price Stability, 
Bank of Canada. 
IMF (2010):  “Canada: 2010 Article IV Consultation–Staff Supplement; Staff Report; and Public 
Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion.” IMF Country Report No. 10/377. Price-Level Targeting – A Real Alternative to Inflation Targeting?   25 
 
 
JEANNE,  O. AND L.  E.  O.  SVENSSON  (2007):  “Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from 
a Liquidity Trap: The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank.” American 
Economic Review Vol. 97(1), pp. 474–490. 
JÍŠA, V. (1993): “Měnová koncepce Aloise Rašína”, CNB Working Paper No. 15. 
KAHN, G. A. (2009): “Beyond Inflation Targeting: Should Central Banks Target the Price Level?” 
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Issue Q III, pp. 35–64. 
KILEY, M. T. (1998): “Monetary Policy under Neoclassical and New-Keynesian Phillips Curves, 
with an Application to Price Level and Inflation Targeting.” Finance and Economics 
Discussion Series No. 27, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
KONIECZNY, J. (1994): “The Optimal Rate of Inflation: Competing Theories and Their Relevance to 
Canada.” Economic Behaviour and Policy Choices under Price Stability, Bank of Canada. 
KRYVTSOV, O., M. SHUKAYEV, AND A. UEBERFELDT (2008): “Adopting Price-Level Targeting 
under Imperfect Credibility: An Update.” Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2008-37. 
LEBOW, D. E., J. M. ROBERTS, AND D. J. STOCKTON (1992): “Economic Performance under Price 
Stability.” Working Paper No. 125, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
MCCALLUM, B. T. (1990): “Inflation: Theory and Evidence.” in B. M. Friedman and F. H. Hahn, 
Handbook of Monetary Economics, Vol. 2 (North-Holland, Amsterdam), pp. 963–1012. 
MATOUŠKOVÁ, S. (2008): Měnová reforma Aloise Rašína, Masarykova univerzita, Master’s thesis. 
MARSHALL, A. (1887): “Remedies for Fluctuation in General Prices.” The Contemporary Review. 
MASSON, P. R. AND M. D. SHUKAYEV (2011): “Are Bygones not Bygones? Modeling Price-Level 
Targeting with an Escape Clause and Lessons from the Gold Standard.” Journal of 
Macroeconomics Vol. 33, pp. 162–175. 
MISHKIN, F. S. (2001): “Issues in Inflation Targeting.” in Price Stability and the Long-Run Target 
for Monetary Policy, pp. 203–222, proceedings of a seminar held by the Bank of Canada, June 
2000. 
MISHKIN, F. S. (2006): “The Inflation-Targeting Debate.” in Issues in Inflation Targeting, pp. 195–
220, proceedings of a conference held by the Bank of Canada, April 2005. 
MITCHELL, B. R (1981): European Historical Statistics 1750–1975, Macmillan Publishers, p. 802. 
MURCHISON, S. (FORTHCOMING): “Consumer Price Index Targeting”, Bank of Canada. 
NESSÉN, M. AND D. VESTIN (2005): “Average Inflation Targeting.” Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking Vol. 37, pp. 837–63. 
ORTEGA,  E. AND N.  REBEI  (2006):  “The Welfare Implications of Inflation versus Price-Level 
Targeting in a Two-Sector, Small Open Economy.” Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 206-
12. 
PRESTON, B. (2008): “Adaptive Learning and the Use of Forecasts in Monetary Policy.” Journal of 
Economic Dynamics & Control Vol. 32, pp. 3661–3681. 26   Jiří Böhm, Jan Filáček, Ivana Kubicová and Romana Zamazalová 
 
   
RAGAN, C. (1994): “A Framework for Examining Real Effects of Inflation Volatility.” Economic 
Behaviour and Policy Choices under Price Stability, Bank of Canada. 
RAGAN,  C.  (2006):  “The Road Ahead for Canadian Inflation Targeting.” in Issues in Inflation 
Targeting, pp. 3–45, proceedings of a conference held by the Bank of Canada, April 2005. 
RAŠÍN, A. (1920): Můj finanční plán, Pražská akciová tiskárna. 
RAŠÍN,  A.  (1922):  Finanční a hospodářská politika ČSR do konce roku 1921, Pražská akciová 
tiskárna. 
RUGE-MURCIA, F. J. (2009):  “Do Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Implicitly Target the Price 
Level?” Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, Cahier 16-2009. 
STEINSSON, J. (2003): “Optimal Monetary Policy in an Economy with Inflation Persistence.” Journal 
of Monetary Economics Vol. 50, pp. 1425–1456. 
STRAUMANN T. AND U. WOITEK (2009): “A Pioneer of a New Monetary Policy? Sweden’s Price-
Level Targeting of the 1930s Revisited.” European Review of Economic History Vol. 13, pp. 
251–282. 
SVENSSON, L. E. O. (1996): “Price Level Targeting vs. Inflation Targeting: A Free Lunch?” NBER 
Working Papers 5719. 
SVENSSON, L. E. O. (1999): “Price Level Targeting vs. Inflation Targeting: A Free Lunch?” Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking No. 31, pp. 277–295. 
SVENSSON, L. E. O. (2001): “The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way of Escaping 
from a Liquidity Trap.” Monetary and Economic Studies No. 19 (Special Edition), pp. 277–
312. 
VENCOVSKÝ, F. (2003): Vzestupy a propady čs. koruny, Oeconomica. 
VESTIN, D. (2006): “Price-Level versus Inflation Targeting.” Journal of Monetary Economics Vol. 
53, pp. 1361–1376. 
WICKSELL, K. (1898): Interest and Prices, MacMillan. 
WOLMAN, A. (2005): “Real Implications of the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates.” Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking 37(2), pp. 273–296. 





Unit Root Tests of the Price Level and the Deviation of the Price Level from its Hypothetical 




ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP
Australia 1993:Q1 - 2010:Q4 -2.076 -2.091 -1.237 -1.196 -1.109 -1.077
Canada 1996:M1 - 2010:M12 -3.163* -2.956 -2.988** -2.796* -2.988** -2.804***
New Zealand 1991:Q1 - 2010:Q4 -0.916 -1.078 - - - -
Sweden 1995:M1 - 2010:M12 -1.800 -2.169 -2.225 -1.630 - -
UK 1992:M10 - 2010:M12 -2.930 -3.274* -0.804 -1.338 -0.289 -0.892
Czech Republic 1998:M1 - 2010:M12 -2.583 -2.301 -3.418** -3.185** --
Ruge-Murcia (2009) estimates
Time Span
ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP
Australia 1993:Q1 - 2009:Q3 -1.956 -1.970 -1.214 -1.208 -1.158 -1.161
Canada 1996:M1 - 2009:M9 -3.531** -3.175* -2.984** -2.714* -2.991** -2.719**
New Zealand 1991:Q1 - 2009:Q3 -1.109 -1.091 -0.198 -0.006 - -
Sweden 1995:M1 - 2009:M9 -1.841 -2.173 -2.006 -1.386 - -
UK 1992:M10 - 2009:M9 -3.479** -3.718** -2.353 -2.940** -1.472 -2.513**
Statistical significance: *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, positive test values are not reported in the table
Statistical significance: *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, positive test values are not reported in the table
Log of the Price Level Deviation from Hypothetical Path
With Intercept No Intercept
Log of the Price Level Deviation from Hypothetical Path
With Intercept No Intercept
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